



STABILISATION

STABILISING AREAS AFFECTED BY CRIMINALISED VIOLENT CONFLICT

A GUIDE FOR ANALYSIS AND STABILISATION STRATEGY

INCAS IN PRACTICE SERIES 01/2014

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ABOUT THE GUIDE AND THE AUTHORS

This Guide is based on our work over the last decade in helping governments and companies address situations where crime is a defining characteristic of violent conflict, or affects the conflict dynamics to a considerable extent – and where stabilisation efforts have to integrate measures that address both grievance and greed.

These situations span those that fall within the scope of armed violence (for example, in certain parts of Jamaica and Mexico), to those where ideologically-driven armed groups are actively engaged in criminal activities or cooperate with organised criminal groups (for example, in Colombia, Nigeria, North Caucasus and Myanmar).

Over the last decade, we have seen more violent conflicts become criminalised and there is an element of criminalisation in most current internal armed conflicts. The need to address the criminal dimension of violent conflicts, we believe, will continue to feature prominently in the work of peace-building practitioners and consultants.

The Guide is the first INCAS in Practice Series

publication for 2014 and part of our commitment to promote debate on good consulting practice in the conflict and security field.

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INTRODUCTION

SPECIFIC CONTEXTS, GENERIC METHODOLOGY?

INCAS Consulting Ltd. works on the basis that every situational context is unique and requires locally informed and problem-specific analysis. This is particularly important in situations of criminalised violent conflict. The dynamics and inter-play of drugs and violent conflict, for example, are different from those associated with human trafficking or crude oil bunkering. So why do we share a generic methodology on how to assess the criminal dimensions of violent conflict? Is it really possible to offer a generic methodology for this purpose?

We believe that there is insight to be found in both the specific and the comparative. In this document we have pulled together some of our practical experience and what we know from comparative analysis. We also believe that for a thorough analysis, there are some 'must haves', a set of elements needed for the analysis to be robust and of practical value. These insights and must-haves are included in this Guide.

HEALTH WARNING

There are two health and safety warnings that come with this methodology.

The first is that in our experience, undertaking the research that would usually inform an analysis of the criminal dimensions of conflict using the steps outlined here is potentially hazardous. Additional guidance on how to conduct such research is available from INCAS Consulting Ltd.

And second, given the specificities of different types of criminal conflicts, we encourage users of this guide to critically assess the relevance of the steps we have enumerated here. The methodology should be used as a resource and its applicability considered or tweaked on a case-by-case basis.

USE AND PARTS

This Guide should enable the preparation of an assessment of the criminal dimensions of a violent conflict – along with the drafting of a stabilisation/mitigation strategy.

Examples of potential applications include:

By governments of regions affected by criminalised violent conflict to develop strategies to stabilise those regions

By companies whose assets are targeted by criminal armed groups to develop strategies to reduce risks and improve the operating environment

In peace support and peace-keeping operations in countries affected by criminalised violent conflict to develop effective stabilisation strategies

A good-enough assessment of the criminal dimensions of violent conflict involves:

1. Revisiting how the problem of profiteering from violence is defined
2. Honing in on those organised criminal activities that sustain/feed violent conflict
3. Mapping and studying relationships between criminal and political armed groups

4. Unpacking underlying grievances, origins and behaviours
5. Describing the specific mechanics of organised criminal activities
6. Describing market dynamics associated with organised criminal activities
7. Understanding how money derived from organised criminal activities flows, grows, and is used
8. Drawing links between organised criminal activities and political and economic elites/ local communities in the country/region
9. Looking at positive and negative impacts of organised criminal activities

These steps are followed by writing up the analysis.

Stabilisation or mitigation strategy development involves:

10. Defining achievable peace-building outcomes based on the analysis and deciding which ones to pursue
11. Drawing up key strategic principles to underpin strategy development and implementation
12. Assessing the responder(s) institutional ca-

pabilities and appetite for risk

13. Identifying tactical measures required for desired peace-building outcomes
14. Pinpointing pitfalls/risks and developing risk management approaches


As end-user institutions have specific templates and approaches to strategy, we here offer only a set of steps to inform what should be reflected in a stabilisation strategy.

DEFINITIONS

This Guide refers inter-changeably to “organised criminal activities” and “criminal activities”. Our definition of “crime” is an activity that constitutes an offence and is punishable by law. Our focus, however, is not on the act of insurrection or rebellion (which itself is defined as criminal by states) or the perpetration of war crimes, but on a set of criminal activities (such as smuggling, illegal crude oil bunkering, extortion, etc.) that armed groups carry out in situations of criminalised violent conflict or armed violence.

“Organised criminal activities” or “criminal activities” are defined as activities involving groups of individuals who have the capability to commit serious crime on a continual basis, which includes elements of planning, control and coordination, and (often financial) gains for those involved. These groups protect their activities through a pattern of corruption and violence, and exploit transnational organisational structures, commerce and communication.

METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW



FOCUS AND DESCRIPTION

STEP 1 PROBLEM DEFINITION

It is often tempting to focus on the ‘crime dimensions’ of conflict when criminal or quasi-criminal/insurgent groups are numerous and active in a particular geographic area. However, once a problem is defined as ‘crime’, it narrows the scope of actions you can undertake and precludes other ways of understanding the issues. Indeed, in many cases today, it is possible to argue that the problem of ‘criminalised violent conflict’ is not a crime problem, but rather a political problem. As such, the first step is to critically think through whether defining a particular conflict situation is indeed a ‘crime problem’ and merits analysis through this lens. If you do think so, then the subsequent steps outlined here are useful.

STEP 2 INFRASTRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE

Honing in on those organised criminal activities that sustain violent conflict requires an analysis of the infrastructure of violence (finance, manpower, firepower, pretexts or justifications for the use of violence).

- Finance to train, feed and pay combatants, pur-

chase weapons and equipment, run camps, etc., is often drawn from multiple sources (natural resources, drugs, trafficking, bank robbery, etc). As a rule of thumb, the longer a violent conflict has been going on, the more sophisticated the financial system that pays for it.

- Manpower to build up the number of combatants, run operations, etc., often draws on unemployed youth. High youth unemployment in conflict-affected countries is an important asset for armed groups and is a core element of the infrastructure of violence.
- Firepower in the form of SALWs, other weaponry, communication and transport, equipment, etc., are often also drawn from multiple sources. These may include recycled weapons from other regional conflicts, trafficked weapons, and weapons captured during combat or raids.
- It is important to recognise and understand the set of ideas that serve as pretexts and justifications for — or motivate — the use of violence. These ideas may circulate as dominant stereotypes, or be propagated actively by combatants’ leaders.

There may be other important components in the

TABLE 1: INFRASTRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE

	Financial infrastructure	Manpower infrastructure	Firepower infrastructure	Ideology infrastructure	Other infrastructure
Qualification					
Quantification					

infrastructure of violence, which are context specific and that can be integrated into the analysis here.

In seeking to focus on key organised criminal activities that sustain conflict, we need to ask ‘what fuels the machinery of violent conflict?’ and to qualify/quantify the answers provided. Table 1 (infrastructure of violence) can be used to map out the infrastructure of violence. See the Annex for examples of a completed Table 1.

STEP 3 MAPPING CRIMINAL AND POLITICAL ARMED GROUPS

Maintaining an armed group costs money – and many political armed groups will set up income streams related to crime. At the same time, individual combatants hold multiple armed group memberships – and use their weapons for a range of purposes.

The third step therefore is to map the criminal and political armed groups involved in the organised criminal activity identified in the previous, and

TABLE 2: MAPPING CRIMINAL & POLITICAL ARMED GROUPS

	Criminal Armed Group	Political Armed Group
Organised Criminal Activity A		
Organised Criminal Activity B		
Organised Criminal Activity C		




draw relationships between them. Table 2 (mapping criminal and political armed groups) can be used for this purpose.

From this map, we single out the main groups and use an adaptation of Makarenko’s (2003) analytical construct to locate them on a spectrum of action¹. Use Illustration 1 to situate identified armed groups on the adapted Makarenko scale. See the Annex for examples of completed Table 2 and Illustration 1.

¹ Tamara Makarenko, “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relationships,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 1 August 2003.

ILLUSTRATION 1: ADAPTED MAKARENKO SCALE



STEP 4 CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND BEHAVIOUR

Organised criminal activities in conflict areas often have roots in grievances. Understanding these grievances and how an organised criminal activity originally evolved (e.g. piracy in Somalia as a response to over-fishing; crude oil bunkering in Nigeria as part of resource reclaiming) will eventually help create nuanced responses.

Importantly, we also try here to understand how the failures of the state (e.g. in providing protec-

tion, basic services, etc.) provide space for organised criminal groups to gain acceptance in different communities. State failures and inadequacies often contribute to an enabling environment for criminal groups to thrive.

And finally, there are likely to be behaviours (cultural, socially accepted norms) that may justify or protect organised criminal activities. Use Table 3 (grievances, enablers, and behaviour) to list contextual factors. A completed example of Table 3 is given in the Annex.

TABLE 3: GRIEVANCES, ENABLERS AND BEHAVIOUR

	Key grievances	Dimensions of an enabling environment	Reinforcing behaviour
Qualification			
Quantification			

STEP 5 MECHANICS OF ORGANISED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

How one details the mechanics of organised criminal activities depends on the activities themselves. Here, it is important to provide a “nuts and bolts” view of how these activities are carried out.

The example in Box 1 describes a typical condensate bunkering operation – with the level of detail required for this kind of analysis.

For the mechanics of drug trafficking, a description may cover the types of drugs, production areas, trafficking routes, known buyers/markets, involvement of other actors, groups with a known history of drug trafficking, local-national-international linkages, seizure and counter-activity.

In Step 5, detail the mechanics of the criminal activities under study.

BOX 1

Mechanics of condensate bunkering

Within the 650m pipeline stretch from the gas plant, there are over 100 tapping points. However, bunkering occurs along the entire length from the gas plant to the flow station. Pressure is highest closer to the gas plant – which explains the greater number of tapping points close to it.

Overall, the oil company estimates that condensate bunkering reaches between 30-32,000 barrels/day at its height. Outsider groups (from other parts of the country and region) are said to run the operations. Armed groups provide security cover, along with elements of government security forces, while local youth serve as the labour. Armed groups involved in this activity source basic goods and services (food, shelter, transport – but also prostitution) from local communities – and also supply youth involved in the work with narcotics.

Condensate is tapped and channeled to barges, which are then used to transport the condensate to clients. Communities will also tap, but in smaller quantities. Product is sold primarily to filling stations. Filling stations will mix condensate with normal fuel to boost volumes. Condensate is also sold directly as fuel for river boats, generators, and in some cases as cooking fuel.

MARKETS, MONEY AND ACTORS

STEP 6 MARKET DYNAMICS

It is important to understand the market dynamics associated to the criminal activities carried out by armed groups. Specifically, we need to understand three elements:

- Demand and supply
- Links between the organised criminal activity and the black/grey/white economies
- Organised criminal activity links and inter-dependencies

First, we want to explore both the demand and supply drivers for the product.

There are often numerous links between an organised criminal activity and the black, grey, and white

economies of a country. In the condensate bunkering example given in Box 1, there are four immediate links: (a) sourcing of goods and services from local communities (grey); (b) links to prostitution and drugs (black); (c) supplying filling stations with condensate product (white); and (d) use of the same transport routes used for regular goods, for illegal goods (white).

Understanding basic links and inter-dependencies between different organised criminal activities is done by answering two key questions:

- What other criminal activities facilitate the one being assessed?
- What other criminal activities are facilitated by the one being assessed?

Use Table 4 (market dynamics of criminal activities) to summarise your information. Where possible, quantification is encouraged. See the Annex for a completed example of Table 4.

TABLE 4: MARKET DYNAMICS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

	Demand and Supply	Black, grey, and white economies	Links and inter-dependencies with other criminal activities
Qualify			
Quantify			

STEP 7 FOLLOWING THE MONEY

Following the money involves assessing its flow (from an expenditure/income perspective and how it makes its way through a laundering process to become white), how it grows (value chains, investment in scale and expansion into new areas), and its other usages (politics, weapons, bribery, etc.). This is probably the most difficult step to complete as these are guarded and secretive processes.

A few notes on the above:

- Money pays for the running of operations (expenditure). Unpacking expenditure items is important, along with the ways profit changes from black to white money. Expenditures include equipment purchases, manpower payments, and transaction costs (bribery, etc.). Laundering mechanisms of profit may involve Forex Bureaux, purchase of capital assets (real estate, etc.), and the use of the banking system, to mention some.

- Tracing how money grows involves looking at revenue associated to value chains (e.g. the price of pure condensate to the price of petrol mixed with condensate; poppies to refined opium), investments in scale so that margins increase, and expansion into other areas (from condensate to drugs) and creation of new markets.
- The use of funds for other purposes is also important to understand. Here we need to consider the connection between organised crime and political patronage, the use of organised criminal activities to fund insurgencies, and so forth.

Use Table 5 (following the money) to summarise your analysis in relation to the assessed organised criminal activities. Again, where possible, quantification is encouraged. See the Annex for a completed example of Table 5.

TABLE 5: FOLLOWING THE MONEY

	Money flows (expenditure and laundering)	Money grows (value chains, scale, and expansion)	Money usage
Qualify			
Quantify			

ASSESSING IMPACTS

STEP 8 ELITE AND COMMUNITY PATRONAGE

Many organised criminal activities function on the basis of or are facilitated by elite and community patronage. Such patronage may take the form of political or business elites “turning a blind eye” or active support for activities, and/or communities allowing criminal groups to operate in their midst, either out of fear and/or because there are associated benefits.

Another example of elite patronage is using the armed groups in political struggle in exchange for financial rewards, protection from prosecution, or other advantages. This type of patronage may be associated to organised/sponsored political violence, armed support in political struggle, etc.

Understanding who patronises organised criminal activities, how and why is often clearer at the community level. Elite patronage is likely to be covert and difficult to assess. Use Table 6 to summarise findings. A completed example of Table 6 is provided in the Annex.

TABLE 6: ELITE & COMMUNITY PATRONAGE

	Elite patronage	Community patronage
Who		
How		
Why		

STEP 9 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS

Organised criminal activities in conflict areas have a range of both positive and negative impacts. These are seen in multiple spheres (livelihoods, social cohesion, security and rule of law, to mention some).

Qualifying and quantifying these impacts is important. Use Table 7 (positive and negative impacts) to do so. The Annex provides a completed example of Table 7.

TABLE 7: POSITIVE & NEGATIVE IMPACTS

	Positive impacts	Negative impacts
Qualify		
Quantify		

WRITING UP

End-user requirements normally determine the outline of your analysis and written report. However, a standard outline of a report on the criminal dimensions of a violent conflict is given below for guidance.

1. Executive summary
2. Introduction
3. Key criminal activities and violent conflict
4. Actors and relationships
5. How does it work?
6. Market dynamics
7. Following the money
8. Elite and community patronage
9. Positive and negative impacts
10. Conclusions: Addressing the criminal dimensions of conflict - opportunities and pitfalls

DEVELOPING THE STABILISATION STRATEGY

STEP 10 DEFINING PEACE-BUILDING OUTCOMES

Understanding the limitations of what can be achieved in terms of peace-building outcomes when dealing with organised criminal groups is important. Defining realistic outcomes is a key first step. These outcomes should be aligned to institutional capabilities and the political environment, and inform the strategic principles and tactical measures subsequently identified.

The spectrum given below offers some perspectives on possible outcomes.



STEP 11 DRAWING STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

Depending on the nature of organised criminal activities - and the outcomes sought - strategic principles can be drawn. Examples of such principles include:

- Organised criminal activities evolve quickly; keep monitoring and adapt strategy as needed
- Think 'transition' - it may be necessary to move in stages towards an envisaged outcome
- Balance reactive and proactive measures
- Integrate measures beyond peace-building, to include law enforcement, human rights, humanitarian and developmental activities
- Clearly define which types of groups you will engage with on what, when (sequencing) and how (principles)
- Ensure clarity on negotiable and non-negotiable items
- Organised criminal activities often work on a transnational basis - link local action with action at other levels

STEP 12 UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Institutional capabilities (the client or your own organisation) determine your engagement space with and on organised criminal activities in conflict settings. Map out limitations and opportunities as they relate to:

- How the problem is defined (sometimes an 'organised crime' problem is, in fact, a political problem)
- The political and legal space to engage with organised criminal groups
- Potential partnerships and cooperation with other organisations
- Resources and networks that may facilitate engagement with organised criminal groups or other stakeholders

Reflect on the implications of these capabilities for the outcomes you seek and measures they enable you to pursue.

STEP 13 KEY TACTICAL MEASURES

The first step in defining tactical measures is to develop a theory of change; how will the desired outcome be achieved? Once this is done, tactical measures can be identified. Tactical measures can be identified in several areas:

- Actions that help dismantle the infrastructure of violence
- Actions that affect the relationships between criminal and political armed groups
- Actions that address underlying grievances, origins, and behaviours
- Actions focused on altering the mechanics of how organised criminal activities are practiced
- Actions that affect market dynamics associated with organised criminal activities
- Actions that choke the flow, growth and use of money derived from organised criminal activities
- Actions that affect the links between organised criminal activities and political and economic elites/local communities in the country/region
- Actions that replace the positive impacts on communities of organised criminal activities and sensitise communities to the negative impacts
- Actions that address trauma and support victims of organised criminal activities (including restorative justice)
- Actions that remove obstacles to effective state police and security action on organised crime
- Actions that build community resilience to organised criminal activities

Identified actions should be SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and timely).

STEP 14 **KNOCK-ON EFFECTS AND PITFALLS**

A logical framework or results framework can be adapted to write-up a strategy drawn from the above elements.

All interventions in violent conflict settings have direct/indirect impacts or knock-on effects, and some that may be positive/negative, intended or unintended. For actions that tackle organised criminal activities, knock-on effects may be numerous. Projecting these before going ahead with a response is basic due diligence.

Here, we simply encourage you to think critically about what any responses to address organised criminal activities may lead to.

Further, there are a range of pitfalls that need to be mapped out for any strategy pursued. These pitfalls may include:

- Individual/group integrity and security is compromised
- Engagement with criminal groups leads to situations of complicity and material support
- Drawing criminal groups into political processes bestows legitimacy
- Engagement with criminal groups and projects implemented for them is seen as rewarding violence
- The implementation of the strategy may become compromised through corruption or sabotage
- Unanticipated knock-on effects render parts of the strategy irrelevant

ANNEX: COMPLETED TEMPLATES


STEP 2 INFRASTRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE

TABLE 1: INFRASTRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE


	Financial infrastructure	Manpower infrastructure	Firepower infrastructure	Ideology infrastructure	Other infrastructure
Qualification	<p>Condensate theft from local pipelines</p> <p>Extortion and kidnapping</p>	<p>Fishing/agriculture livelihoods untenable due to insecurity</p> <p>Widespread under-employment and unemployment of youth</p>	<p>SALWs and heavier weapons present</p> <p>Gunboats and sophisticated communication equipment used</p> <p>SALWs traded for condensate</p>	<p>Widespread entitlement discourse. "It's our oil, so we can take it" is used to justify condensate bunkering activities.</p>	<p>Armed groups and criminal cartels provide sense of belonging for youth</p>
Quantification	<p>Condensate market worth estimated at USD4M monthly</p> <p>Extortion of small businesses widespread; 20-30 locals kidnapped weekly - USD30-60 ransom/person</p>	<p>Youth unemployment over 90%</p> <p>Thugs and combatants from Group A and B often paid 10-20 times over minimum wage</p>	<p>New SALWs widespread</p> <p>Armed groups better equipped than government security forces</p>		

STEP 3 MAPPING CRIMINAL AND POLITICAL ARMED GROUPS

TABLE 2: MAPPING CRIMINAL & POLITICAL ARMED GROUPS



ILLUSTRATOR 1: ADAPTED MAKARENO SCALE



STEP 4 CAUSES, ORIGINS AND BEHAVIOUR

TABLE 3: GRIEVANCES, ENABLERS, & BEHAVIOUR

	Key grievances	Dimensions of an enabling environment	Reinforcing behaviour
Qualification	Marginalisation Limited access to benefits from oil exploitation	The state cannot provide basic services to rural populations	A feeling of entitlement Stealing crude is “taking what is ours”
Quantification	Less than 15% of oil revenue reaches communities in the form of development benefits	Insecurity is widespread in the region	

STEP 6 MARKET DYNAMICS

TABLE 4: MARKET DYNAMICS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

	Demand and Supply	Black, grey, and white economies	Links and inter-dependencies with other criminal activities
Qualify	<p>Limited fuel available in remote waterways makes condensate an attractive product.</p> <p>Few other livelihood options mean that youth in communities are drawn to condensate bunkering as a way of making money.</p> <p>Limited number of geographical locations that lend themselves to effective condensate bunkering.</p>	<p>Armed groups source goods and services from local communities.</p> <p>Members of armed groups fuel local prostitution and drug consumption.</p> <p>Sales points of condensate are filling stations in a large city nearby.</p> <p>Transport of condensate draws on same riverine routes as other goods</p>	<p>Larger scale crude oil bunkering and artisanal refining make condensate bunkering activities less of a priority for authorities, while also creating the transport infrastructure and processes required for it to take place.</p> <p>Funds generated by condensate bunkering are used to purchase weapons.</p>
Quantify	<p>Normal fuel costs in remote waterways is in the region of USD1.5/litre. Condensate sells at USD0.50/litre.</p> <p>Youth unemployment stands at 90% and above in communities around condensate bunkering site.</p> <p>Total pipeline length that is subjective to condensate bunkering is 20km</p>	<p>Average income of petty trader in communities around bunkering site has gone up by 40%.</p> <p>Filling stations amount to 70% of sales of bunkered condensate.</p>	<p>Security forces pocket USD200 per barge let through.</p> <p>Average cost of AK47 (used) is USD80.</p>

STEP 7 FOLLOWING THE MONEY

TABLE 5: FOLLOWING THE MONEY

	Money flows (expenditure and laundering)	Money grows (value chains, scale, and expansion)	Money usage
Qualify	<p>Key expenditure items for condensate bunkering: (a) barges, weapons, fuel; (b) manpower; and (c) bribery, access fees.</p> <p>Indications that some bankers are facilitating laundering of funds, although much is spent on "rest and recovery" periods in large town close to site.</p> <p>Forex bureaux are widely used to launder funds.</p>	<p>Key value chains include informal riverine filling station (condensate only) to official petrol stations (condensate mixed with petrol).</p> <p>Scale is increased through the purchase of additional barges to carry condensate.</p> <p>Expansion areas seem to be in trafficking and dealing of drugs.</p>	<p>Political patronage is likely at district government and provincial government level.</p> <p>Evidence of strong connections between condensate bunkering and insurgent groups.</p>
Quantify	<p>Average cost of a barge is estimated at USD10,000.</p> <p>Average foot-solder is paid USD300/month.</p> <p>Security forces pocket USD200 per barge let through.</p> <p>Central Bank license for Forex Bureau operation costs USD50,000.</p>	<p>Value chain increase from bunkering point to informal filling station is USD0.30/litre; to official filling station is USD0.50/litre.</p> <p>Average cost of a barge is USD15,000.</p>	

STEP 8 ELITE AND COMMUNITY PATRONAGE

TABLE 6: ELITE & COMMUNITY PATRONAGE

	Elite patronage	Community patronage
Who	Local/provincial/national politicians Commanders of local security forces Oil companies (indirect)	Small businesses Community leaders Youth
How	Political figures are known to interfere in police arrests of individuals involved in condensate bunkering. Commanders of local security forces are known to “turn a blind eye” to bunkering operations. Oil companies appear not inclined to actively stop bunkering practices.	Communities enable barges to pass through the areas they control. Small businesses provide goods and services to armed groups running bunkering operations. Youths actively seek work in bunkering operations.
Why	Bunkering proceeds are known to feed into election campaigns. Local security force commanders and their families have been attacked by armed groups working for bunkerers. Oil companies cannot process all condensate to sites – bunkering may be convenient.	Bunkering groups pay access fees to community leaders for their barges. Absence of other markets makes bunkering groups important clients. Youth unemployment is very high.

STEP 9 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS

TABLE 5: FOLLOWING THE MONEY

	Positive impacts	Negative impacts
Qualify	<p>Community receives some income from bunkering activities (access fees)</p> <p>Small business/petty traders in communities receive increased revenue</p> <p>Bunkering groups are engaged in some charitable activities (transport for the sick, etc.)</p> <p>Youths get some employment, although it is hazardous</p>	<p>Increases in drug use and prostitution at the community level</p> <p>Severe environmental impacts that affects health and livelihoods (fishing)</p> <p>Increases seen in village level violence - with occasional killings</p> <p>Explosions and accidents associated with bunkering activities have killed many</p>
Quantify	<p>Community access fees for barges are said to be around USD200/barge</p> <p>Income of small businesses/petty traders is said to have increased by 40%</p> <p>Youth are paid 10-20 times over the minimum wage</p>	<p>Three explosions over the last year killed 20-30 youth.</p>

ABOUT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY (INCAS) CONSULTING LTD.

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