As the next Ukraine Recovery Conference takes shape, one trend deserves closer attention. The annual event brings together governments, the private sector, civil society and international institutions to coordinate support for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Since its launch in Lugano in 2022, the role of local and regional actors in recovery thinking has become more explicit. What began as a principle of decentralised, inclusive recovery has evolved into a clearer recognition that municipalities and regions are not just implementers of reconstruction, but central actors in shaping how recovery works in practice, including how priorities are set, contested and sustained over time (URC, 2022; URC, 2024; URC, 2026).
This matters beyond Ukraine, including in other conflict-affected settings where recovery is similarly mediated through local institutions and relationships. Recovery may be financed internationally and planned nationally, but it is prioritised, negotiated and judged locally. UNDP’s guidance on local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings makes the point clearly: where local governance is inclusive and context-sensitive, it can help restore legitimacy, support participation, reduce exclusion and build a more resilient foundation for peace and development (UNDP, 2014). The real question, then, is not whether local authorities can deliver projects, but whether local governance can help turn recovery into processes that are trusted, conflict-sensitive and socially legitimate.
That distinction matters because recovery debates still rely heavily on a technical vocabulary: infrastructure, finance, procurement, coordination and delivery. These are essential, but in conflict-affected settings, a focus on rebuilding assets is not enough. Recovery is also shaped by how priorities are set, how decisions are explained, whose voices are heard, who is left waiting, and whether institutions are perceived as fair when they are operating under pressure. Far from being simply a subnational administrative layer, local governance is a political and relational arena where recovery is tested in practice, often under conditions of pressure, constraint and uneven capacity (OECD, 2022; UNDP, 2023).
Ukraine illustrates this dynamic with unusual clarity, but it is not unique in doing so. In many conflict-affected territories, local institutions are expected to restore services, absorb displaced populations, manage contested priorities and maintain public trust at the same time. OECD’s 2025 fragility framework—which assesses fragility against 56 indicators of risk and resilience—reinforces the importance of this broader lens by treating fragility not as a narrowly institutional problem, but as a combination of exposure to risk and insufficient resilience across security, political, societal and human dimensions (OECD, 2025). That helps explain why recovery durability depends both on what is rebuilt and on the extent to which institutions and communities can absorb strain without deepening grievance or exclusion.
Research on Ukraine’s wartime local resilience shows that the country strengthened its local institutional capacity between 2014 and 2022. Ukraine’s post-2014 decentralisation process—which included institutional reform, strengthened hromadas[1], administrative-territorial consolidation, fiscal decentralisation and stronger local self-government—contributed to local institutional capacity, autonomy and continuity under extraordinary stress. Local self-government was not simply a delivery mechanism; it was part of how crisis response, adaptation and public functioning were sustained (Rabinovych et al., 2024; OECD, 2022).
This wartime resilience has illustrated how local capacities had been developing before 2022, particularly through stronger hromadas, greater local ownership of decision-making and more capable local institutions. In practice, resilience meant that municipalities and hromadas were able—unevenly and under very different security conditions—to keep basic services functioning, organise humanitarian support, assist displaced people, support territorial defence efforts and co-operate horizontally with other communities and partners. It was therefore both institutional and relational: a matter of formal capacity, but also of local networks, trust and the ability to adapt quickly under pressure.
For local government to function effectively under pressure and lead a process of sustained recovery, much depends on trust. This is where the broader idea of local governance matters: trust is shaped not only by formal mandates, but by how institutions communicate, include communities, manage trade-offs and remain accountable. Research into displacement and social cohesion in Ukraine shows that the level of trust in local authorities, local organisations and other people is closely linked to the ability of displaced people to integrate into new environments. Lower levels of trust are associated with weaker prospects for durable local settlement (IOM, 2025). This aligns with broader thinking, with the World Bank framing social cohesion in terms of relationships within communities, across groups, and between people and institutions.
Trust, in other words, is not simply a desirable social good but one of the operating conditions of recovery. Where local institutions are not trusted, recovery may still deliver outputs, but it is less likely to generate a stable sense of belonging, social confidence or long-term cohesion.
This is one reason local governance deserves more attention in peace, security and recovery discussions. It is often described in institutional terms: mandates, competencies, budgets and administrative performance. All of that matters. But local governance also includes the relationships through which public institutions interact with communities, civil society, service providers and informal actors. Those relationships shape whether difficult decisions are understood by communities, whether contestation can be managed, and whether citizens see recovery as something done with them, to them, or around them. Recovery durability depends on whether local actors can deliver concrete results, but also on how they govern trade-offs, communication and inclusion while doing so.
This is also why participation and conflict sensitivity need to be treated more seriously — and more carefully. Genuinely participatory processes are important; where consultation is purely symbolic, frustration deepens rather than recedes, particularly where expectations are raised but not met. Conflict sensitivity is not a niche add-on, either—though it can constrain or complicate decision-making under pressure. Recovery strategies in post-disaster or conflict situations should minimise the risk of doing harm and maximise opportunities for strengthening social cohesion (EU, UN, World Bank, 2018). In practice, routine recovery decisions—on housing, aid, service restoration, compensation, local economic priorities or reintegration—can either intensify tensions or help contain them. Local governance is where many of these trade-offs are made visible, mediated and absorbed.
Recent peace-perceptions research in Ukraine adds an important, if indirect, insight. People often define peace in personal and social terms, focusing on the human elements of safety, family life, a return home and resumption of normality. But when it is the negotiations of a peace process being foregrounded, the focus often narrows sharply towards security and territory (Daniels and Polegkyi, 2025). This lesson applies across geographies. In conflict settings, it can be easy for the everyday social dimensions of peace and recovery to be crowded out by a narrative that focuses on security and bargaining. Local governance is one of the arenas where those everyday dimensions—fairness, access, communication and lived safety—can remain institutionally visible and be prioritised.
None of this means that we should romanticise local-level governance. Local institutions can reinforce exclusion, absorb pressure unevenly, or be overwhelmed by expectations they cannot meet. Local governance is also not a substitute for national leadership, security provision or macroeconomic recovery. The point is more practical than idealistic. Strong local governance does not remove conflict from recovery. It helps manage recovery in the presence of conflict (OECD, 2022; Rabinovych et al., 2024).
If recent Ukraine Recovery Conferences signal anything, it is that international recovery thinking is beginning to catch up with this reality. The next step is to act on it in how recovery is designed, financed and governed. Local governance should not be treated only as an implementation channel for national recovery strategies. It should be recognised as a strategic arena where reconstruction meets trust, where investment meets legitimacy, and where the long-term viability of recovery is tested in practice.
This affords an opportunity for measured optimism. In places marked by conflict and fragility, local governance is one key arena in which public institutions can feel visible and relevant in ordinary life—through how services are restored, how decisions are explained, and whether people feel they are being treated fairly.
References
Daniels, L.-A. and Polegkyi, O. (2025) Perceptions of Peace in Times of War: Public Opinion Evidence from Ukraine. International Negotiation, 30(1), 43-71.
European Union, United Nations and World Bank (2018) Guidance for PDNA in Conflict Situations.
IOM Ukraine (2025) Displacement and Social Cohesion in Ukraine: Discrimination, Inclusion and Long-Term Intentions. Thematic Brief, February 2025.
OECD (2022) Rebuilding Ukraine by Reinforcing Regional and Municipal Governance. OECD Multi-level Governance Studies.
OECD (2025) States of Fragility 2025.
Rabinovych, M., Brik, T., Darkovich, A., Savisko, M., Hatsko, V., Tytiuk, S. and Piddubnyi, I. (2024) Explaining Ukraine’s resilience to Russia’s invasion: The role of local governance. Governance, 37(4), 1121-1140.
UNDP (2014) Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings: Building a Resilient Foundation for Peace and Development.
UNDP / Congress of Local and Regional Authorities under the President of Ukraine (2023) Guidelines for Establishing a Regional Mechanism for Inter-Agency and Inter-Territorial Coordination of the Recovery and Development of Communities and Territories.
Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) (2022) Lugano Declaration / URC 2022. Official conference materials.
Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) (2024) Preliminary Agenda / Conference Results | URC 2024. Official conference materials.
Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) (2026) URC 2026 – Gdańsk, Poland. Official conference website.
World Bank (n.d.) Social Cohesion and Resilience.
[1] Ukraine’s local self-governing municipalities or territorially defined local communities with elected self-government